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SUMMARY 
The concessions for the construction and operation of urban railway lines have demonstrated 
to have a great interest in the development of the transport. As much in France as in England 
interesting examples in this sense exist: Metrolink in Manchester, Supertram in Sheffield, the 
tramway of Rouen and Strasbourg or the underground of Toulouse. Actually most of these 
cities (that has began to develop this new services at the beginning 90ths) or has been 
constructed or is under construction another line based on the results obtained. 
 
In Spain, although in the past there were important projects in concession. The extensions of 
the underground of Madrid, as well as the metros of Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao have 
been constructed with budgetary financing, although using in some cases an agency in order 
to not increase the deficit of the public administration. Nevertheless, at the present time a 
great "boom" of projects of urban railway lines in concession in Spain exists, due to different 
factors: 
 
1. The good results obtained in Europe. 
 
2.  The necessity to improve the system of transport in a great number of Spanish cities - 
it has more than 40 than the 200,000 inhabitants surpass. 
 
9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND OWNERSHIP IN 
LAND PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
 
 
2
3. The lack of budgetary resources of the local public administrations, who cannot 
approach the construction of this type of projects, of high cost.  
 
4. The non-existence of a precise legislative frame of financing of the urban and 
metropolitan transport in Spain. 
 
This causes that already projects in concession in great cities have been materialized: 
 
1. Metro line of Arganda that connects the Spanish capital with two municipalities of 
the metropolitan Southeast. This is working since 1999.  
 
2. Tramways of Barcelona. The Autoritat de Transport Metropolità, ATM, organism 
responsible for the public transport in Barcelona, has granted during  the last years 
two biddings for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of tramways 
lines  that are integrated into  the tariff system of the metropolitan area of Barcelona. 
 
3. Light railways of Andalusia,  that are under construction after been developed by a 
B.O.T. system in Seville and Malaga. Granada ones probably is going to be 
developed by a  different system after the last experiences. 
 
4. Light  railways of Tenerife in Canaries islands. The financing has focused by  a 
different form  from the rest of the concessions that have been included  in this 
paper. In Tenerife the public Administration, the Insular Town hall, is going to 
construct a tramway network by  a contract to a society to a mixed society, 
Metropolitano de Tenerife S.A. MTSA, in whom private capital is going to 
participate until a maximum of 30%.   
 
5. New light railways in Madrid and his metropolitan area. 
 
In this paper it is going to be presented the main issues about these project and: 
 
1. Analysis of the problems detected in the alive processes in Spain. 
 
2. A few final considerations of the authors with regard to the participation deprived 
versus to the public model. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concessions for the construction and operation of urban railway lines have demonstrated 
to have a great interest in the development of the transport. As much in France as in England 
interesting examples in this sense exist: Metrolink in Manchester, Supertram in Sheffield, the 
tramway of Rouen and Strasbourg or the underground of Toulouse. Actually most  of these 
cities (that has began to develop this new services at the beginning 90ths) or has been 
constructed or is under construction another  line based on the results obtained. 
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In Spain, although in the past there were important projects in concession.  The extensions of 
the underground  of Madrid, as well as the metros  of Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao have 
been constructed with budgetary financing, although using in some cases an agency in order 
to not  increase the deficit of the public administration.  Nevertheless, at the present time a 
great  "boom" of projects of urban railway lines in concession in Spain exists. 
 
In this paper it is going to be presented the main issues about these projects and: 
 
• Analysis of the problems detected in the alive processes in Spain. 
 
• Final considerations of the authors with regard to the private participation versus 
to the public model. 
 
GENERAL OVERVIEW TO SPANISH EXPERIENCES 
As it was mentioned above, it has been developed or it is being developed a large number of 
projects, due to different factors: 
 
• The good results obtained in Europe. 
 
• The necessity to improve the system of transport in a great number of Spanish 
cities - it has more than 40 than the 200,000 inhabitants surpass. 
 
• The lack of budgetary resources of the local public administrations, who cannot 
approach the construction of this type of projects, of high cost.  
 
• The non-existence of a precise legislative frame of financing of the urban and 
metropolitan transport in Spain. 
 
This causes that already projects in concession in great cities have been materialized: 
 
• Metro line of Arganda that connects the Spanish capital with two municipalities 
of the metropolitan Southeast. This is working since 1999.  
 
• Tramways of Barcelona. The Autoritat de Transport Metropolità, ATM, 
organism responsible for the public transport in Barcelona, has granted during 
the last years two biddings for the design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of tramways lines that are integrated into the tariff system of the 
metropolitan area of Barcelona. 
 
• Light railways of Andalusia,  that are under construction after been developed by 
a B.O.T. system in Seville and Malaga. Granada ones probably is going to be 
developed by a different system after the last experiences. 
 
• Light railways of Tenerife in Canaries islands. The financing has focused by  a 
different form from the rest of the concessions that have been included in this 
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paper. In Tenerife the public Administration, the Insular Town hall, is going to 
construct a tramway network by a contract to a society to a mixed society, 
Metropolitano de Tenerife S.A. MTSA, in whom private capital is going to 
participate until a maximum of 30%. 
 
• New light railways in Madrid and his metropolitan area. 
 
Arganda Metro 
The Arganda metro links the Spanish capital to two municipalities in the south-east of the 
metropolitan area. Bids for the project were requested in May 1996 through a European-wide 
invitation to tender for a “public works concession for project preparation, performance of 
works and management of a public service” organised by the Madrid Regional Government. 
Two groups put in bids and the contract was won by the one formed by Metro de Madrid 
(42.5%) and a financial institution, Caja de Madrid (25%), together with a group of top-level 
construction companies (32.5%): Transportes Ferroviarios de Madrid (TFM). 
 
 
The bid assessment criteria were: 
 Period for completion: a maximum of 
20 months 
 Project quality, technical solution and 
level of equipment 
 Connectivity with public transport 
networks 
 Level of service offered, frequency, 
time and comfort 
 Proposed fare structure, subsidies 
requested and investment to be 
made 
 Technical characteristics 
 The line is 18.3 km long, built 
openly except for 2km in a false 
tunnel, with 4 stations 
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Barcelona Tramways 
 
Autoritat de Transport Metropolità, ATM, the 
body responsible for public transport in 
Barcelona, has in the last few years made two 
invitations to tender for the design, 
construction, operation and maintenance of 
tramways to be incorporated into the fare 
system in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. 
 
These projects will be the first urban rail transit 
systems operated by private companies in 
Spain. In the first line (Trambaix, which is 
already in service) the public operators hold 
20% of the operating company’s capital, and in 
the second (Trambesòs) they hold 5%. 
Figure 1 annex 3.1: Barcelona Tramway 
 
In both cases the contract was awarded to the same consortium, Tramvía Metropolità, led by 
FCC and Alstom and with the same private participation in the share capital: 
 
• Operating companies (29%): FCC-Connex, Sarbus, Soler and Sauret. 
 
• Construction companies (40%): FCC, Necso and Comsa. 
 
• Rolling stock manufacturer (25%): Alstom. 
 
• Financial institutions: Banco de Sabadell and Société Générale de Banque (6%). 
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As it happened, this group was the only 
bidder for the second line, though on the 
face of it there are no synergies between 
the two projects, as shown by the facts 
that two wagon sheds, two workshops 
and two control centres have had to be 
built, as there is no physical link 
between the two lines. Legally speaking 
the two concession companies are 
different. But it was planned that the two 
lines would be linked up, which would 
give the tramway great potential, as this 
would be the most urban section. 
 
Seville Metro 
The Seville metro is a project with a long history. Work began on its construction more than 
20 years ago but was stopped for technical reasons after 4 km of tunnel had been dug, and 
from that time it became a subject of political debate, with the continuation of the work being 
postponed. 
 
  
Figure 1 annex 3.2: Seville Metro tunnel   Figure 2 annex 3.2: Sevilla Metro tunnel 
 
To carry out the project, the public company “Metro de Sevilla, S. A.” was set up, dependent 
on the Department of Public Works and Transport of the Andalucian Regional Government 
and with the participation of the town councils of Seville, Mairena del Aljarafe, San Juan de 
Aznalfarache and Dos Hermanas. 
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Figure 3 annex 3.2: Plan of Seville Metro 
Source: Sevilla Metro 
 
Four lines have been planned, with a total length of 63 km. An invitation to tender was made 
in 2002 for the design, construction, operation and maintenance for 35 years of the first line, 
between Mairena del Aljarafe and Dos Hermanas. 
 
Tenerife Metro 
The funding of the Tenerife tramway has been approached differently. The public authority in 
Tenerife, the Island Council, is going to have a tramway network built by means of a 
concession to a mixed corporation, Metropolitano de Tenerife S. A. (MTSA), in which private 
companies are to hold a share not exceeding 30% of the total capital. 
 
MTSA was set up in 2000 with 100% public capital – from the Tenerife Island Council (CIT) 
– and in 2003 an invitation to tender was made to bring a private company into the project. 
The companies bidding to join MTSA must be operators of light rail transits and will have to 
make an investment yet to be specified. Initially this was set at 10 million euros (20% of the 
capital), but as no companies were interested in joining the project under those conditions the 
amount has been adjusted downwards. 
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The candidate selection procedure involves following criteria: 
 
• Financial soundness and credit standing 
 
• Technical brief (experience, commitment to transferring know-how, operating 
study) 
 
• Financial bid, payments for availability and soundness and coherence of the 
business plan, pursuant to the documents relating to the subsequent concession 
contract for the building of the tramway network. 
 
Once the private partner joins MTSA, a contract is to be signed between the Island Council 
and MTSA for the construction and operation of the light rail transit according to the 
specifications. 
 
Madrid Light Rail Transits 
The Madrid Regional Government has set new goals for the participation of private enterprise 
in the new light rail transits, though in a way not yet fully defined. It appears to be envisaging 
an operating concession with investment finance. 
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Under the aegis of the Department of Transport and Infrastructure of the Madrid Regional 
Government, in 2003-2007 MINTRA is to build 72.7 new kilometres of metro line and 81 
new stations, which would serve over 735,000 people. 
 
The works for most of these projects are due to start in September 2004, and will be as 
follows: 
 
• Extension of the metro network to the districts of Chamartín and Hortaleza. 
(With 6 stations).  
 
• Extension of the metro network to La Elipa. (Extension of Line 2). 
 
• Extension of the metro network to Villaverde. (Extension of Line 3, with 6 
stations).  
 
• Extension of the metro network to the districts of Sanchinarro and Las Tablas. 
(With 4 stations).  
 
• Extension of the metro network to Alameda de Osuna. (Extension of Line 5, 
with 2 new stations).  
 
• New station in Arganzuela. (On Line 6). 
 
• Extension of the metro network to Coslada and San Fernando de Henares. (With 
8 stations).  
 
• New station in Pinar del Rey. (On Line 8)  
 
• Extension of the metro network to Carabanchel Alto. (Extension of Line 11, 
with 2 stations).  
 
• Metronorte, sections 1 and 2. (Chamartín and Alcobendas – San Sebastián de los 
Reyes, with 12 stations)  
 
• New light rail transit to Boadilla del Monte. (With about 15 stations).  
 
• New light rail transit to Pozuelo de Alarcón. (With 12 stations).  
 
• New light rail transit to Navalcarnero. (With 12 stations). 
 
The authorities are considering whether to run the projects on a BOT basis because of a public 
deficit problem, or as an operating concession. 
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LEGAL NOVELTIES IN CONCESSION PROCESSES IN SPAIN 
The new Spanish Concessions Act (Law 13/2003 regulating concession contracts in public 
works) establishes a new legal framework, whose main characteristics are as follows: 
 
• It maintains the basic concept of concessions and the award procedure, and 
respects the existing special provisions in each set of sectoral regulations, 
extending the concession model to all public works and to all levels of public 
administration and public bodies dependent thereon. 
 
• It provides that public subsidies may be cash and non-cash contributions and that 
the consideration for the licensee may be the price for use of the works and the 
return associated with the operation of the shopping area adjoining the 
infrastructure. 
 
• It provides the possibility of using the “shadow toll” system and cross-funding 
for different public works provided that they have a functional relationship and 
affect each other’s operation. 
 
• It provides the obligation to restore the economic equilibrium when this is 
substantially altered (either way). 
 
• It regulates the following concession-funding systems: issues of bonds and other 
securities, securitisation of assets, concession mortgages and equity credits. 
 
• It sets a maximum period of 40 years for concessions for construction and 
operation of public works, and 20 years for operating concessions. 
 
• It provides a very interesting clause: the progress clause, which will be remarked 
on in detail below. 
 
An innovation in the new regulations of particular significance to infrastructure users is the 
so-called progress clause, included in article 244.4, pursuant to which the licensee must 
ensure that the infrastructure complies with what is provided at any one time, according to the 
progress of science, in applicable technical, environmental and user-safety legislation. That is, 
the licensee is obliged to make any investments that may be required to adapt the 
infrastructure to the applicable technical standards, thereby guaranteeing the quality of the 
service offered to users. 
 
“NEW CONCESSIONS OF URBAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS IN SPAIN” 
 
 
 
11
Furthermore, the Act provides for the introduction in concession specifications of 
mechanisms for measuring and assessing the quality of service offered by the licensee to the 
infrastructure users. 
 
The quality parameters established may serve as a basis for the application of financial 
benefits or penalties to the licensee, according to what is provided in the corresponding 
specifications, and this will also have highly positive effects on infrastructure maintenance.   
 
The introduction of assessment for certain service quality parameters involves a profound 
change in maintenance operations, with the focus switching from the infrastructure itself as an 
asset to the infrastructure as the physical means of providing a particular service, its ultimate 
purpose. 
 
THE VARIOUS PARTNERS IN SPANISH CONCESSIONS 
Consortia may include all or just some of the agents involved in the process: engineering 
companies, civil-engineering construction companies, rolling-stock suppliers, system 
specialists or integrators, railway operators, financial partners, consulting companies or 
project managers. These agents may be partners or be covered by external contracts: 
 
• The construction companies do the civil engineering work. Given the great 
importance of the sector in Spain, they are normally also responsible for 
managing the supplies and electromagnetic installations for the system as a 
whole. Construction joint ventures in the licensee consortium are often 
responsible for the project as a whole. 
 
• Rolling-stock suppliers may also be partners, in which case they provide the 
system technology and are responsible for its integration. Another option is for 
them to be suppliers of the consortium, in which case the role of integrator may 
be played by a specialist rail engineering company acting as technical assistant 
to the consortium. 
 
• The railway operators, if they are integrated in the consortium as partners, will 
be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the system for the duration 
of the concession. To achieve the purpose they must offer specific quality and 
cost conditions. Their involvement as subcontractors involves the risk of lack of 
coordination between the construction project, the operating project and the 
reality of the future operation. If the authorities award a BOT project to several 
groups that may not have railway operators, the decision-taker is left in doubt as 
to the conditions under which the operation will actually take place and the 
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problems that may arise owing to the operator’s non-involvement in the 
performance of the project. 
 
• The licensee consortium may or may not include financial partners, depending 
on the type of finance for the project. Their presence enhances the licensee’s 
interest in the long term, which coincides with that of the authorities. 
 
• The engineering companies conduct demand studies in some cases, draw up 
projects for the construction work and the installations, take charge of the works 
management (which the authorities delegate to the licensee), and support the 
operators. If they are partners their involvement in the project will be greater. 
 
ROLES OF THE VARIOUS PLAYERS IN A SPANISH CONCESSIONS 
PARTICIPANTS ROLE 
Construction groups 
 Partner in the concession generally with leadership through the construction 
group’s concession company  
 Construction and even installations 
Rolling-stock manufacturers 
 As partners, they supply the rolling stock and are responsible for its 
integration 
 As suppliers, possibly belonging to the supply joint venture with the 
construction company 
Operators 
 Their presence as partners is not usual in Spain but guarantees experience and 
involvement in the long term  
 The great importance of construction groups in Spain causes operators to 
remain as subcontractors 
Financiers and banks 
 They supply the capital and financial guarantee 
 They are normally little involved in the formation of the business 
 They may be involved only as advisors on financial arrangements 
Consultants 
 These may work for: 
- The licensee 
- The construction joint venture 
 They may be involved in: 
- The bid 
- The project 
- Works management: quality control 
- Consulting on operation 
 Their role as partners is still controversial  
Source: Own data 
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PROBLEMS DETECTED IN TENDER PROCESSES IN SPAIN 
Generally speaking, the risks detected in an analysis of various experiences, and Spanish ones 
in particular, may be classified as follows: 
 
PROJECT AND CONSTRUCTION RISKS 
TYPE OF RISK ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE LICENSOR TO LIMIT IT  
Innovation in design  Choice of a proven system 
Increase in cost 
 Good definition of the project (tender with construction project 
including detailed cartography and geotechnics) 
 Choice of a construction company with experience 
 Turnkey project with risk transferred to the construction company 
Delays  
 Good definition of the project  
 Choice of a construction company with experience 
 Application for authorisations and permits well in advance 
 Specification of penalties in the turnkey contract 
Constructor-operator relationship 
 Good definition of the project 
 A precise agreement between the construction company and the 
operator on the commissioning procedure, including guarantees 
 Choice of a single constructor/operator, or of a constructor and 
operator belonging to the same group 
Quality of work 
 Choice of a construction company with experience 
 Good definition of parameters 
 Establishment of controls and existence of rigorous methodology 
and control equipment 
Good 
performance 
Relationship between 
subcontractors 
 Choice of a single construction company that takes responsibility 
for the works as a whole 
Geological   Performance of preliminary studies Unforeseen 
circumstances Meteorological and others  Insurance 
Source: Manual for planning, funding and roll-out of urban transport systems, 2004. Zamorano&Bigas&Sastre 
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OPERATING RISKS 
TYPE OF RISK 
ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE LICENSOR/LICENSEE 
TO LIMIT IT 
Overall demand 
 Performance a good traffic study including all possible 
hypotheses 
 Exhaustive planning of parameters in the scenarios and 
acceptance of reasonable hypotheses Demand 
Demand/price elasticity 
 Performance of preliminary sensitivity studies 
 Study of other experiences (of other systems in the same city 
and of the same system in other cities) 
Acceptable fare level 
 Setting of a suitable fare level 
 Determination of fare adjustment formulae according to the 
roll-out of the project 
Non-payment of subsidies 
 Signing of strong government commitments, if necessary 
through multilateral agencies 
 Sale of collection rights: securitisation 
Reduction in 
income Advent of competitive 
transport systems making it 
necessary to lower fares  
 Establishment of non-competition or financial equilibrium 
clauses with subsidies in the event of change in the specified 
conditions 
 Preliminary signing of cooperation agreements with all the 
levels of government involved in the project 
Increase in operating costs 
 Choice of an operator with experience 
 Precise definition of the operating agreement 
Operating cost 
overrun Increase in public authority 
requirements 
 Specific contract clauses covering changes in the 
requirements of the public authority and specifying the need 
to re-establish the financial equilibrium in the event of 
modifications 
Source: Manual for planning, funding and roll-out of urban transport systems, 2004 
 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS 
TYPE OF RISK ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE LICENSOR TO LIMIT IT 
Rise in the price index 
 Risk coverage instruments, insurance, guarantees 
 Indexing of fares to the price index 
Interest rate  Risk coverage instruments, insurance, guarantees 
Financial 
parameters 
Exchange rate 
 Risk coverage instruments, insurance, guarantees 
 Revenue in strong currencies 
 Local funding 
 Optimum alignment of revenue and payments in the various 
currencies 
Financial commitments (Refinancing / 
counterparts) 
 Insurance 
Source: Manual for planning, funding and roll-out of urban transport systems, 2004 
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INDIRECT RISKS 
TYPE OF RISK 
ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE LICENSEE/LICENSOR 
TO LIMIT IT 
Natural catastrophes 
 Equilibrium clauses, appropriate legislation 
 Insurance  
Political embargoes, wars, 
etc. 
 Coverage by bilateral or multinational agencies 
Force major 
Permits, licences 
 Involvement in the project of the competent tiers of government 
 Prior commitment of government to facilitating administrative 
processes 
Financial risks (economic / financial / energy / 
devaluation crises) 
 Coverage by bilateral or multinational agencies 
 Renegotiation clauses 
 Adaptation of agreements and open agreements 
Changes in indirect 
legislation 
 Renegotiation clauses 
 Adaptation of agreements and open agreements 
Legal actions brought by 
third parties 
 Check compatibility of the existing legal framework with private 
participation in public service projects 
 Strengthen the legal and institutional framework in advance 
Institutional and 
legal risks 
Conflicts between local 
groups 
 Coverage by bilateral or multinational agencies 
 Strengthen the legal framework in advance 
Social acceptability of public-private 
participation 
 Run public information campaigns sufficiently in advance and 
keep them up during construction and commissioning 
 Emphasise information on quality 
 Establish a suitable fare structure, balanced with the previously 
existing one 
 Improve quality of service 
Source: Manual for planning, funding and roll-out of urban transport systems, 2004 
 
Having set out the generic risks that are encountered, we may sum up the main specific 
problems in the latest tender processes as follows: 
 
• The periods for preparing bids, no doubt influenced by media coverage in 
electoral processes, have been short, no longer than four months. These periods 
are clearly critical for the preparation of the corresponding demand studies and 
tender projects, which help define the investment costs. The periods are too short 
given that the investments are large and the operating period long, which 
ultimately involves high operation and maintenance costs over a long time. 
 
• In the case of Seville, the lack of homogeneity in the passenger fares proposed 
by the bidders was a problem in the award process, as it was difficult to compare 
the bids. Other aspects were: 
 
− The bid preparation costs were very high, owing largely to the architecture 
projects. 
− The equity credits were not particularly attractive. 
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− Another practical problem in the comparison process was the lack of 
homogeneity in bid structure, which made it hard to tell (for example) how 
many park-and-ride places were included: some included this detail in the 
text, others in drawings, others in the budgets.  
 
• The fare set in the Malaga metro tender process for use by all bidders was €0.72 
excluding VAT. That is, a much higher fare than the current one for city buses, 
which is €0.55. The specifications said that this fare was to be used in the 
financial model for determining revenue and subsidies. But they did not specify 
that it was to be used for calculating demand, which caused confusion among the 
bidders. If this fare is used for estimating demand, taking into account that most 
of the passengers expected to use lines 1 and 2 of the metro will come from 
public transport, the difference in fare between the two modes reduces uptake 
and therefore requires a greater financial contribution from the regional 
government. This was the interpretation made by most of the bidders, who 
thought this was the spirit of the specifications. The winning group, led by FCC 
but with strong involvement of local companies,(SANDO, VERA, y AZVI) took 
the specifications literally and used the specified fare for calculating revenue in 
the model but estimated demand using a fare equal to the bus fare, which is how 
things will actually be. This meant that their financial bid was very competitive, 
and as a result they won. In the next tender a fare should also be set to facilitate 
comparison, but it should be closer to the fare that will actually apply – equal to 
the bus fare or slightly higher. 
 
• The fact that there was only one bidder in the tender processes for the Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife light rail transit and Tran Bessos in Barcelona means the 
processes were not properly conceived, as it is vital for there to be competition: 
 
− In Tenerife there was just one bidder, with partial public participation. This 
reflected the lack of guarantees for the awardee, as according to the 
specifications it would have no interest in the success or failure of the 
operation. This is another vital aspect of these processes, as there must be 
risk and benefit involved if it is to make sense for private enterprise to take 
part. In a way, the Tenerife tender process is reminiscent of the one for the 
Arganda metro, for which there were two bidders, but not natural bidders, as 
there was a public operator in each group. The guarantees were insufficient 
or the risks excessive. 
− In the Tran Bessos tender, the sole bidder was the winner of the previous 
tender for the Baix Llobregat tramway, led by FCC and Alstom, which 
allowed the group to negotiate clearly favourable terms. 
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Though the project is now past the tender stage, we should note the problems in the working 
of the concession company because of disputes between partners with very diverse interests. 
This is reflected in the constant changes of management that have occurred in Barcelona and 
that are now occurring in Seville. 
 
Finally it is worth noting the delay in the tenders for the light rail transits in Madrid due to 
uncertainty about the management and finance system – either BOT or a concession for 
operation only. All this depends on whether the formulae are accounted for as public deficit. 
 
COMPARATIVE COSTS IN RECENT EXPERIENCES 
This section makes a comparative analysis of investment costs in several European and 
Spanish cities. The conclusions are as follows: 
 
• The available investment data for France show that construction costs there are 
three times higher than in Spain. 
 
• In Spain the project with highest costs is the one in Seville, because of the longer 
underground section. 
 
• The project development periods are very variable but are normally 10 to 20 
years. The case of Seville is exceptional in that it began in the 70s as a public 
development and ended up as a BOT project. 
 
• Yearly passenger investment is high; the lowest levels are in the two projects in 
Barcelona. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RECENT EXPERIENCES 
City Length 
Investment 
(millions of 
euros) 
Investment 
ratio 
(€m/kms) 
Development 
period from 
the start of 
planning 
(years) 
Management 
system 
(years of 
concession) 
Demand in 
millions of 
passengers 
per year 
Investment 
ratio by 
annual 
demand 
CROYDON 28 317 (2000) 11,3 12 B.O.T. (99) - - 
TOULOUSE 10 220 (1993) 22 20 
B.O.T. 
(redeemed 
after 4 years) 
- - 
ROUEN 11.20 472 (1994) 42.20 10 
Private 
operation 
18 26 
BAIX 
LLOBREGAT-
BARCELONA 
16 
217 (2000) 
288 (with 
financial 
costs) 
13.5 
18 
- 
10 B.O.T. (25) 17 12 
TRAMBESOS 14.1 205 (2002) 14.5 12 B.O.T. (25) 11 18 
SEVILLA 19 428 (2003) 22.5 39 B.O.T. (32) 15 28 
VALENCIA 10 150 (1995) 15 10 Public 6.5 23 
Source: Own data 
 
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT OF THE FUTURE CONCESSION 
PROCESS IN SPAIN 
As we have seen, in recent years there has been a proliferation of private involvement in rail 
projects in Spain, where these were traditionally public affairs. On the basis of international 
experiences but also of the experience of traditional concession systems in Spain, there 
follows a summary of some conclusions of our analyses: 
 
• There are errors still being ironed out in tender processes, but those in Andalucia 
are notable for the competition that there has been, vital to a proper utilisation of 
private enterprise. 
 
• But in these tender processes the economic aspect has been of particular 
importance in the award process and has given rise to problems of bid 
comparison. 
 
• Comparative investment costs in public and private solutions show that these are 
appreciably higher in the case of BOT systems and that only opportunity costs 
can justify the application of those systems, though this should not be taken too 
far, as it might remove such opportunities in the future. 
 
• The extent of the participation of construction companies remains a problem in 
relation to the need for greater involvement by operators and other agents such 
financial institutions and consulting companies. 
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• BOT concessions are undoubtedly one form of funding but are not a cure-all, 
and do not release the authorities from the obligation to define projects properly 
and to control their quality. We should not forget that these projects not only 
address the issue of mobility but also and above all contribute to the very nature 
of a city. In fact, urban development costs are normally significant and the need 
for agreements between social agents is a key issue. 
 
• Finally, demand risk in this type of project is high and must be shared, so the 
band system based on risk-sharing is a very interesting option. 
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